The immediate aftermath of an armed conflict is a key window of opportunity to build sustainable peace and security. Whether and how violence arises during that time has profound effects on a country's political and economic development. Yet, conceptualizing post-conflict violence has remained elusive. Much of this difficulty arises because post-conflict violence is a liminal phenomenon with a dual nature: it emerges during transitions from war to peace and is a combination of new strategic incentives and wartime organizational legacies. This paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of post-conflict violence with a theory-grounded typology, based on two axes: strategic aims (predatory, constructive) and degrees of cooperation (directed, coordinated, spontaneous). The premise of this categorizing effort is that with a more solid grasp of the mechanisms driving post-conflict violence and its variation we can design more suitable policies to lower its incidence.
Introduction
Are violent societies a natural outcome of war? The troubled security environments of postwar Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Libya, Nepal, and South Sudan seem to suggest so. Violence, however, did not emerge in postwar Banda Aceh, Costa Rica, Croatia, Namibia, or Rwanda. Why do some societies relapse into violence while others do not? Under what conditions does post-conflict violence emerge, decrease, or escalate? We lack exhaustive answers to these questions, despite the frequency of post-conflict violence, its centrality in hampering state-building efforts and economic development, and the intensity of the human suffering it causes.
The literature on post-conflict violence suffers from three main, inter-related problems: lack of conceptual clarity, under-theorization, and dearth of reliable, disaggregated empirics. Consequently, the current practice cannot rely on a coherent framework to guide its policies. This article focuses on the first concern. It contributes to a more systematic understanding of post-conflict violence with a definition and a theory-grounded classification of the phenomenon. After identifying some conceptual challenges in the study of post-conflict violence (Section 3), I develop a typology with the axes "strategic aims" and "degrees of coordination" (Section 4). Combined, these two concepts generate six ideal types of post-conflict violence -revolutionary, repressive, revisionist, opportunistic, vengeful, and anarchic -which I discuss detailing mechanisms and offering examples. The conclusion summarizes and indicates future research avenues.
Understanding violence after war
Authors use the term "post-conflict violence" to mean many violent phenomena, often without distinguishing among their different causal paths. Post-conflict violence also eludes comprehensive theory-building because it takes different forms in different contexts: endemic unemployment fueled "warlordism" in West Africa; youth violence destabilized Cambodia and East Timor; organized crime and vigilantism weakened democratic institutions in Guatemala and Honduras; armed militias abused former Qadhafi loyalists in Libya (Amnesty International 2011).
2
The study of post-conflict violence bridges academia and practice. Yet, the literature dealing specifically with this phenomenon is sparse. Numerous studies address related issues -disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants (Annan et al. 2011; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Duclos 2012; Muggah 2005 Muggah , 2009 Özerdem 2009; Porto, Alden, and Parsons 2007; Themner 2011) , militarized politics and elections (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Dunning 2011; Lyons 2005; Paris 2004; Sisk 2008) , transitional justice, rule of law, and security sector reforms (Arthur 2011; Call 2007; Kritz 1995; Mobekk 2006; Quinn 2009; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006; Teitel 2000; United Nations SecretaryGeneral 2004; Weitekamp and Kerner 2002; Williams, Nagy, and Elster 2012) , and peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies (Autesserre 2010; Berdal 2009; Chetail 2009; Darby and Mac Ginty 2008; Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr 1997; Krause 2005; Muggah 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009) . In other words, the literature asks how to prevent a relapse into war, whether certain interventions are effective, how violence affects individuals, communities, and postwar politics (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004) , what social groups development programs should address, etc.; but contributions addressing postwar violence as such remain an exception (Boyle 2010; Herreros 2011; Smith and Offit 2010; Suhrke and Berdal 2012; Zinecker 2006) . Among these few, earlier works measured the incidence of postwar murders at a high level of aggregation (Archer and Gartner 1984) , while recent ones (Boyle 2009; Einsiedel et al. 2012 ) focus on case studies and the microlevel dynamics of violence. The latter approach cannot situate each case in a broader universe, which cross-national studies are, instead, more apt to do. Both research strategies suffer from the difficulty of collecting sensitive event data in highly volatile and weakly institutionalized settings.
3 In order to explain the emergence and variation of post-conflict violence within a comprehensive theoretical framework, we need to balance generalizability and attention to causal mechanisms.
The success of such exercise requires dealing with the intrinsically dual nature of post-conflict violence. While often classifying this phenomenon according to its different types, authors tend to confound the violence's causes with its forms. The former -pertaining to the dynamics driving the violence's occurrence and variation -are conceptually prior to the latter -which indicate the repertoires, the scope, and the targets of the violence. Type indicates a somewhat hybrid category between forms and causes. Thus, understanding post-conflict violence implies a two-stage analysis: first identify its recurrent features across time and space -or types -and then explore the dynamics driving its occurrence and variation within each pattern. This article centers on the first part of the analysis, or on the conceptualization of post-conflict violence.
3 As a result, post-conflict violence lies at the margin of existing datasets. The COW Project and the UCDP/PRIO do not account for violence happening outside an "armed conflict." The UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, the UCDP Geo-referenced Event Dataset, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Homicide Statistics, and the World Bank Death Rate Dataset are closer to capture the phenomenon of post-conflict violence, but alone cannot provide the full picture as they cover only killings, by specific armed groups, and their timeframes are not always limited to the aftermath of a war. The first and the second datasets measure "the use of armed force by a state's government or by a formally organized group against civilians" (Sundberg, 2009 ). The third looks at "killings by government officials without due process of law." The fourth covers the "unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person." The fifth collects crude death rates, or "the number of deaths per year, per 1000 people."
Classifying post-conflict violence

Definition
The first step toward improved conceptual clarity is a definition allowing comparisons across different fields and disciplines, and across post-conflict scenarios. Accordingly, I define post-conflict violence as "harm directly and purposely inflicted to people during the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict's official cessation."
4 This parsimonious definition focuses solely on the violence's temporal aspect and highlights its occurrence after an armed conflict, following the UN convention that sets the end of the post-conflict phase at 2 years after the hostilities' official cessation (United Nations Secretary-General 2004 ). An intuitive remark in one of the most comprehensive works on the subject supports this choice: the post-conflict period, to be called as such, "cannot last too long" (Suhrke and Berdal 2012) .
My definition purposefully excludes the violence's types and causes so as to avoid a) a priori excluding at least some phenomena often observed in post-conflict settings, b) making assumptions about the violence's causes without prior, rigorous empirical scrutiny and c) limiting the possibility of explaining different types of post-conflict violence within one theoretical framework.
Some examples illustrate this point. For her theory of post-conflict violence, Suhrke uses Tilly's notion of "collective violence" (Suhrke and Berdal 2012) , thereby focusing on violence requiring high coordination among perpetrators. Yet, despite scant empirical records, we know that post-conflict violence is often private (domestic violence) and not always organized or coordinated (sexual violence). Finally, some international institutions (e.g., the EU) set the end of a post-conflict phase after the peaceful and successful conclusion of two rounds of "free and fair" elections. Yet, labeling a postwar period ended when economic or political indicators reach a certain threshold leads to fuzzy criteria and circular reasoning.
4 Defining the immediate aftermath of a conflict may be difficult to operationalize from an empirical lens and using any threshold (e.g., 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, etc.) to capture this may seem arbitrary. However, a 2-year cut-off point seems reasonable as this coincides with the scope conditions of the theoretical framework suggested in this paper. I follow the UCDP definition, according to which a conflict is terminated "each time [it] fails to reach the level of inclusion in one calendar year," i.e., the 25 battle-related deaths criteria. This can occur "by any of the following events: 1) victory; 2) peace agreement; 3) ceasefire agreement; 4) low activity; 5) no activity; or 6) other (see: www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions; emphasis added).
Typology
My conceptualization of post-conflict violence rests on the idea that violence emerges from a combination of actors' incentives and opportunities. "Post-conflict violence" refers to both the past war and the period following it (Suhrke and Berdal 2012, 6-7) . This dual nature implies that past dynamics, or wartime legacies, and the war's immediate aftermath, or forward-looking dynamics, concur in producing post-conflict violence and in determining what types emerge (Alessandrini, in: Dunnage, 1999; Grandi 2012 Grandi , 2013 Muggah 2009; Suhrke and Berdal 2012) .
Forward-looking dynamics: new incentives, strategic aims
In other words, the war's end generates incentives, which, in turn, shape the actor's motivation to use violence. As Ikenberry notes, "the destruction caused by war and the breakdown of the old order provide opportunities to establish new basic rules and organizing arrangements" (Ikenberry 2001, 50) . I capture this idea with the concept strategic aims, or the new postwar incentives, which constitute the typology's first axis. Different war-to-peace transitions create different institutional environments and generate different incentive structures for the actors operating in them. Roughly, violence after a war's end is used either for constructive or predatory purposes. Perpetrators aim to consolidate the political environment inherited from the war, or to change it, or to stir it in their favor, or to exploit it, or sometimes their use of violence has no purpose at all.
Old organizations: wartime legacies, degrees of coordination
Wartime groups' capacity to orchestrate action often survives the war's end. In particular, former armed groups retain the ability to coordinate violence, through organizational structures developed during the war. As Wallander (2000) suggests, adaptable assets promote institutional survival. I capture this idea with the concept degrees of coordination, the second typology's axis, which pertains to the perpetrators' ability to use wartime organizations and pre-existing networks to commit violence. Coordination can vary significantly. It can be fully orchestrated, or directed from the center -the locus of decision-making power. In this setting, the center and the periphery -the actual perpetrators of the violence -cooperate fully to achieve coherent goals. Coordination is fragmented or issue-specific, when the perpetrators do not respond to an overarching chain of command, but can coalesce around tactical objectives. Finally, coordination can be fully spontaneous, when neither the center nor the periphery is able to affect the other level. 
Six ideal types of post-conflict violence
The combination of strategic aims and degrees of coordination generates six ideal types of post-conflict violence, as summarized in Table 1 above.
My categorization captures the more politically salient type of post-conflict violence at any given time and place. By no means are these categories stable over time, mutually exclusive, or fully isolated from one another (Boyle in: Suhrke and Berdal 2012) . In Iraq, for instance, anarchy led to violence in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's deposition, but later the violence became "sectarian" (Dodge 2012 ). Often, a fragile post-conflict security apparatus facilitates common criminality (e.g., robberies or unlawful appropriations), which is all but unrelated to politically motivated homicides occurring simultaneously.
Type #1: Revolutionary violence denotes a transformative intent, but does not necessary precede a full-fledged revolution. 6 This scenario emerges when perpetrators aim at radically changing the political system and/or the socio-economic fabric of the country emerging from war. In order to do so, they follow a coherent, directed plan, shared by all participants. Examples are the violent labor protests in post-WWI Italy and the class-based violence in post-WWI Russia. Tilly (2003, 13-15) juxtaposes leaders of centralized organizations guiding followers and drunken sailors scuffling with military police to distinguish different types of "interpersonal violence" by "the extent of coordination among violence actors." In other words, there is a qualitative difference between private and public violence. As Boyle (in Suhrke, 2012, 98-99) puts it, "revenge" and "reprisal" violence differ because the latter has "communicative aims" geared toward a public audience. 6 My use of the term "revolution" is less demanding than Skocpol's (1979) "both a change in state institutions and a change in social structures."
Type #2: Repressive violence often precedes the instauration of a dictatorship, as Franco's purges in post-civil war Spain (Herreros 2011) . In this type of violence, perpetrators aim to strengthen the newly created political system and to protect it from (actual or potential) challengers. Here too, the perpetrators' degree of coordination is highly cohesive, for the state or a similarly overarching and well-organized institution often perpetrates this type of violence.
Type#3: Revisionist violence aims to manipulate the postwar power allocation. The perpetrators engage in a political contestation because they do not accept the agreement ending the war or other aspects of the new order. Their incentives vary across a wide spectrum: consolidating influence and privileges obtained with the war, creating a new political or socio-economic identity for themselves or their ally, strengthening pre-war allegiances (e.g., ethnic, religious, ideological), changing the security environment (how to prevent or punish crime), etc. In a nutshell, revisionist violence has various objectives: political domination, self-defense, leadership competition, normative pursuit, etc. (Lawrence 2010; Themner 2011) . The perpetrators coordination is fragmented: no central authority guides their action. The periphery rebels against or obstructs the center's goals and uses violence to further its different priorities. In post-independence East Timor, resistance veterans used violence to acquire political privileges. After the Khmer Rouge collapse in Cambodia, some members used violence to maintain their control of areas along the Thai border. Type#4: Opportunistic violence does not envision any change. Rather, actors exploit the system's weaknesses and loopholes to obtain profit for themselves and/or their allies. The perpetrators' objectives can be economic, political, or status-based: low opportunity cost of joining gangs, abundance of lootable natural resources, profitable illegal crops or trafficking, appropriations during privatizations and land reforms, occupations during resettlements, new employment opportunities, etc. The perpetrators neither coordinate their intents with a central command nor pursue the same goals among themselves, but collude, or find mutually satisfying "live and let live" agreements, or issue-specific collaboration, whereby each side pursues its interest and does not thwart the other's. Examples are the Democratic Republic of Congo and West Africa, where armed actors use violence to perpetrate lucrative war economies, or the Central American "maras" that control drug routes through widespread violence.
Type #5: Vengeful violence is perpetrated to settle private scores. A weak security sector apparatus or state capture by exclusionary societal groups enable it, but individual-and community-level dynamics drive its variation. In this type of violence -as in the following -perpetrators do not coordinate and their violent acts are eminently private. Numerous vengeful killings occurred in Uganda after the collapse of Amin's regime in 1979 and Obote's demise in 1985 (Rice 2009 ).
Type #6: Anarchic violence happens because it can, but without coherent intents or organized objectives. In a deteriorating security situation, where no authority is able to exercise clear control over the population, actors use violence as legitimate means to settle disputes or to address their emotions, such as fear (Petersen 2002) . They choose it over other non-violent means because they deem it more effective or because they obtain more pleasure from this type of agency (Wood 2003 
Conclusion
Only a better understanding of what drives post-conflict violence can further our chances of curbing and preventing it (Wood 2006) . Consequently, this article builds a conceptual framework to classify its different, but recurring, types. The combination of new incentives and old organizations, or of the perpetrators' strategic aims and coordination degrees generates six ideal types of post-conflict violence: repressive, revolutionary, revisionist, opportunistic, vengeful, and anarchic. These types represent a diminishing ability or willingness of violent actors to affect the system, in which they operate. Put it differently, the relevance of long-term strategic goals as the driver of the violence and the perpetrators' coordination and cohesiveness decrease progressively as we move along the six types. Revolutionary and revisionist violence differ because with the former, the perpetrators aim at changing the system, while with the latter, they aim to change their relative position within it. In the revisionist type, a limited aspect of the system must change for the actors to profit from it; while in the opportunistic type, the system must remain unchanged for the perpetrators to benefit. Opportunistic and anarchic violence differ because while both are aimed at some return for the perpetrators, the former has a strategic intent, but the latter does not.
This conceptualization leaves numerous outstanding issues. For example, it does not account for the variation the forms of violence (e.g., killings, sexual violence, beatings, torture). Even if two settings present the same type of postconflict violence, its distribution and incidence, and the actors' profiles vary significantly. Further work is needed to uncover the causal mechanisms leading to this variation: What do "center" and "periphery" indicate in different contexts? Where are, along that spectrum, the perpetrators of the violence? Is there a political cleavage separating victims and perpetrators? Does the violence happen along the same lines as the conflict just ended or new cleavages emerge? This article provided but the first step toward a rigorous theorization of post-conflict violence by offering a comprehensive framework to classify its recurrent types across time and space.
